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EXDIS MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

EZ2:

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 07/15/2000 (NEWSOM, D.)

TAGS: MILI, MASS, EG

SUBJECT: US MILITARY PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS
AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. RAPIDLY BROADENING US REQUIREMENTS FOR CREDIBLE AND
VISIBLE MILITARY SURGE CAPABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST/
SOUTHWEST ASIA REGION HAVE SPAWNED A VARIETY OF DIVERSE,
SOMETIMES AD HOC, DEMANDS. WHILE THERE IS A COMPLETE
CONSENSUS HERE CONCERNING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BASIC
OBJECTIVE, WE AGREE WITH YOU THAT IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS,
EGYPT'S INTERESTS, AND THE INTERESTS OF OUR REGIONAL
FRIENDS THAT THE NATURE OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OR THE SHEER
VOLUME OF POSSIBLE SUPPORTIVE EFFORT NOT BE ALLOWED TO
OVERLOAD THE EGYPTIAN CIRCUIT. ESSENTIAL HERE IS A MONI-
TORING EFFORT BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE LISTING OF OUR NEEDS
AND PRIORITIES. IN SHORT, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT A PIECE-
MEAL APPROACH WOULD CREATE THE WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE
WORLDS: A POSSIBLE OVERLOAD THROUGH INADVERTENCE, AND THE
PROJECTION OF A USG RESPONSE TO EGYPTIAN AND REGIONAL
PRESSURES AND INTERESTS THAT IS UNGUIDED AND INCOHERENT.

OSD, ARMY, NAVY, USAF Review completed

3. WHILE THE CAIRO WEST F-4 DEPLOYMENTS AND THE RAS
BANAS SURVEY ARE ALREADY IN TRAIN, THE IMMINENT NEED
TO APPROACH THE GOE IN TWO ADDITIONAL AREAS -- PLANS
FOR AN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE ON THE RED SEA COAST BY THE
SIXTH FLEET MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (MAU) DEPLOYING TO THE
INDIAN OCEAN THIS FALL AND RESURRECTION OF THE QUESTION
OF NPW TRANSITS OF THE SUEZ CANAL -- SHARPENS THE RE-
QUIREMENT FOR THIS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION. THERE
ARE CERTAIN NON-MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AS WELL (E. G.,
BROADCASTS TO SOVIET MUSLIMS) DEMANDING EARLY ATTENTION.

4. WHAT FOLLOWS IS IN EFFORT TO LAY OUT PRELIMINARILY
FOR INTERNAL MISSION REVIEW, BUT AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE,
THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES ENVISIONED FOR EGYPT OVER THE
NEXT YEAR OR SO. THIS MESSAGE HAS INTERAGENCY CONCUR-
RENCE. IN ADDITION TO YOUR COMMENTS ON THE PRIORITIES
THEMSELVES, WE SOLICIT YOUR VIEW ON THE STRATEGY FOR
PRESENTATION OF THE REQUESTS TO THE GOE.

5. BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER, WE NEED MISSION'S EVALUA-
TION OF EFFECT REQUESTS WILL HAVE ON OUR RELATIONSHIP
WITH GOE, AND THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE STABILITY OF
THE GOE ITSELF SHOULD OUR REQUESTS BE GRANTED. WE ARE
ALSO INTERESTED IN YOUR ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO THREE
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS: (1) HOW WOULD THE GOE REACT TO A
DEMARCHÉ PROVIDING A COMPREHENSIVE OUTLINE OF ALL OUR
UPCOMING REQUIREMENTS, (2) WOULD THE GOE BE MORE LIKE-
LY TO REJECT SOME ACTIVITIES IF GIVEN FULL PARAMETERS
INITIALLY AND (3) WHAT WOULD BE THE QUID PRO QUID RE-
QUESTED AS THE PRICE OF ACQUIESCENCE? WE ARE THINKING
NOT ONLY OF IMMEDIATE COSTS OF A GIVEN PROGRAM BUT ALSO
OF THE CUMULATIVE RETURN EGYPT MAY EXPECT, INCLUDING IN
AREAS BEYOND THOSE WITH A DIRECT MILITARY CONNECTION --
E. G., ECONOMIC AID, AVIATION AGREEMENTS, ETC.

6. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED WITH THE PUBLIC INFORMATION
SIDE OF THESE PROGRAMS. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS
AS TO HOW WE CAN BEST TAILOR OUR PUBLIC INFORMATION PRO-
GRAMS TO PUT THESE REQUIREMENTS IN THE BEST LIGHT IN
EGYPT. WE HAVE IN MIND NOT ONLY THE HANDLING OF THE

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PROJECTS THEMSELVES BUT ALSO THE CONTEXT OF OTHER EFFORTS--E. G. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE--AND EVENTS IN WHICH THEY WILL BE VIEWED. AND WE ARE THINKING NOT ONLY OF SUCH INFORMATION EFFORTS IN CAIRO BUT HERE AS WELL.

7. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION IN ROUGH ORDER OF PRIORITY:

(A) NPW TRANSITS OF SUEZ CANAL: DOD DESCRIBES THIS AS "THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE STEP TOWARDS MAXIMIZING US FLEET FLEXIBILITY". IT WOULD SAVE UP TO TWO WEEKS TRANSIT TIME IN MOVING NUCLEAR POWERED TASK FORCES FROM THE MED TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. AS ALL ARE AWARE, TRANSITS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT SHIPS IN THIS CATEGORY, NUCLEAR CARRIERS, ARE MOOT UNTIL CANAL DREDGING AND WIDENING IS COMPLETE AS NOW ANTICIPATED THIS FALL. THE OBJECTIVE, HOWEVER, IS TO REACH TIMELY AGREEMENT NOW WITH THE GOE ON THIS ISSUE SO THAT TRANSITS FOR LESSER SHIPS COULD BEGIN ASAP, AND FOR CARRIERS, JUST AS SOON AS THE CANAL IS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THEM. TALKING POINTS PREPARED BY USN PRESENT ARGUMENTS, NOT ONLY WITH STRATEGIC RATIONALE--WHICH WE EXPECT WILL BE WELL RECEIVED BY SADAT--BUT ALSO IN RESPONSE TO EGYPTIAN CONCERNS RE ISSUES OF COMPARABLE TREATMENT FOR SOVIETS AND SAFETY DURING TRANSIT. WE WILL BE FORWARDING TO YOU SOON A SECDEF TO MOBARAK LETTER FOR YOUR USE IN PRESENTING THIS ASPECT OF OUR PRIORITIES TO THE EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP WHICH LAYS DOWN OUR BASIC APPROACH, INCORPORATING USN ARGUMENTS.

(B) CONTINUED ACCESS TO EGYPTIAN FACILITIES: AT PRESENT, THIS IS AIMED SPECIFICALLY AT WADI QENA, WHICH HAS BEEN USED BY US FORCES SINCE EARLY THIS YEAR. WHILE THIS REQUIREMENT COULD BE REDUCED OR EVEN ELIMINATED BY AVAILABILITY OF IMPROVED FACILITIES AT RAS BANAS (SEE BELOW), AT PRESENT, CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT ACCESS IS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY SINCE RAS BANAS WOULD NOT BE OPERATIONAL FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS. WHILE THE QENA OPERATION HAS RECEIVED SOME RECENT PRESS PLAY, IT IS STILL RELATIVELY LOW KEY AND APPARENTLY CAUSING FEW PROBLEMS. ANY SIGNS THAT LONGEVITY IS GIVING THIS THE APPEARANCE OF A "US BASE" AS DISTINCT FROM US USE OF AN EGYPTIAN FACILITY WOULD RAISE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, TO A DEGREE, SOME ACTIONS TENDING TO CREATE SUCH AN APPEARANCE MAY BE BEYOND OUR CONTROL--E. G., INCREASED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THIS PROGRAM.

(C) RAS BANAS DEVELOPMENT: ALL PARTIES UNDERSTAND THAT WE WILL BE WORKING WITHIN SADAT'S PARAMETERS--SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT OF AN EGYPTIAN FACILITY WHICH WE COULD USE IN EMERGENCIES. WITH THE SURVEY HAVING BEEN COMPLETED, WE WILL SOON BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE DECISIONS ON HOW WE WISH TO MOVE ON THIS PROJECT. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING DEVELOPMENT OF RAS BANAS IN PHASES, STARTING WITH A CAPACITY TO STAGE A BRIGADE, AND A FIGHTER SQUADRON, INCREASING IN TIME TO SUPPORT A DIVISION AND A FIGHTER WING, AND ULTIMATELY TO HANDLE A SUSTAINED OPERATION. EACH PHASE WOULD ENTAIL PREPOSITIONING OF SOME GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, FUEL, MUNITIONS, ECT., WHICH COULD REQUIRE THE PERMANENT PRESENCE OF 50 TO 100 US PERSONNEL. THESE NEED NOT BE UNIFORMED PERSONNEL, BUT IN ALL PROBABILITY SOME WOULD BE. FYI: AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE WERE SOME EARLIER DISCUSSIONS OF MORE EXTENSIVE PREPOSITIONING (E. G., HEAVY EQUIPMENT SUCH AS APCS AND TANKS) AT RAS BANAS. THIS HAS BEEN SCALED BACK FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS--E. G., HIGHER PRIORITY DEMANDS FOR EQUIPMENT ELSEWHERE--AND THERE ARE NO CURRENT PLANS FOR STORAGE OF SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EGYPT. END FYI. FINALLY, WHILE WE DO NOT PLAN TO STATION COMBAT FORCES AT RAS BANAS FOR EXTENDED PERIODS, WE WOULD PLAN TO UTILIZE THE FACILITIES PERIODICALLY FOR EXER-

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USES TO TEST OUR DEPLOYMENT/STAGING CAPABILITIES FOR
 RDJTF UNITS (SEE PARA 7 A BELOW).

(D) BIB/RADIO LIBERTY BROADCASTS TO SOVIET MUSLIMS:
 THIS INVOLVES CARRYING THROUGH ON THE APPROACH EARLIER
 MADE FIRST TO MANSOUR HASSAN AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO FORMER
 PRIME MINISTER KHALIL. WHILE RECOGNIZING THE SENSITIVE
 NATURE OF THIS PROPOSAL, THE REQUIREMENT CONTINUES TO
 HAVE A HIGH PRIORITY. WE NOTE REPORT IN CAIRO 13671
 THAT THIS OPTION HAS ALREADY SURFACED IN EGYPTIAN
 PERIODICAL AL DAWA. PRESUMABLY, NY TIMES ARTICLE
 (STATE 172357) WILL CAUSE FURTHER SPECULATION. HOW
 HAS THE PUBLIC AIRING OF SUCH BROADCASTS AFFECTED THE
 CLIMATE FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE ON THE PART OF THE
 EGYPTIANS?

(E) FULL SURGE ACCESS TO CAIRO INTERNATIONAL IN AN
 EMERGENCY: IN AN ACTUAL CRISIS, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY
 FOR UP TO 110 MAC AIRCRAFT SORTIES PER DAY TO TRANSIT
 THROUGH EGYPTIAN FACILITIES, WHICH COULD POSSIBLY OVER-
 LOAD RAS BANAS EVEN WHEN OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS THERE
 ARE COMPLETED. IN ANY CASE, WE WOULD VIEW CAIRO INTER-
 NATIONAL AS A SUPPLEMENT. IN TERMS OF IMMEDIATE RE-
 QUIREMENTS, WE WOULD SEEK AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AS WELL
 AS SOME FACILITIES UPGRADE, PARTICULARLY INCREASES IN
 POL STORAGE CAPABILITIES. THESE ADDITIONAL FACILITIES
 WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO GDE AUTHORITIES ON A ROUTINE BASIS.
 WE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PLAN TRIAL EXERCISES THROUGH
 CAIRO INTERNATIONAL: THIS OPTION WOULD ONLY BE ACTI-
 VATED IN THE CASE OF A REAL EMERGENCY.

(F) USAF F-4 DEPLOYMENT TO CAIRO WEST: EMBASSY ALREADY
 HAS DETAILED PARAMETERS OF THIS EFFORT WHICH NECESSITA-
 TED INTRODUCTION OF ABOUT 500 US UNIFORMED AND DOD
 CIVILIAN PARTICIPANTS INTO CAIRO AREA FOR A 90-DAY
 PERIOD OF DEPLOYMENT. AT PRESENT, THERE ARE NO FIRM
 PLANS FOR MORE THAN ONE SUCH DEPLOYMENT. BOTH USG AND
 GDE WILL HAVE TO REVIEW THE INITIAL EXPERIENCE AS WELL
 AS ONGOING REQUIREMENTS TO DETERMINE IF FURTHER SUCH
 USAF DEPLOYMENTS MIGHT BE REQUESTED/APPROVED. POSSI-
 BILITY EXISTS, HOWEVER, OF SECOND VISIT MID-1981.

(G) MARINE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE ACROSS A RED SEA BEACH:
 THE FIRST SUCH EXERCISE WAS PLANNED TO COINCIDE WITH
 SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1980 DEPLOYMENT OF SIXTH FLEET ARG/
 MAU INTO INDIAN OCEAN. FREQUENCY THEREAFTER MIGHT BE
 AS MANY AS FOUR ANNUALLY, AT LEAST SOME OF WHICH MIGHT
 BE IN EGYPT. SIZE OF UNITS COULD RANGE FROM AS SMALL
 AS A COMPANY (APPROX. 200 TROOPS) UP TO 1,800 MARINES
 LANDED ON BEACH BY BOAT AND/OR HELICOPTER. MAU EXER-
 CISES COULD ALSO ENCOMPASS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FROM
 CARRIER VTOL FIGHTERS, EMBARKED WITH ARG, OR CARRIER-
 BASED FIGHTERS IF AVAILABLE. EXERCISES COULD PROCEED
 AS UNILATERAL US EFFORTS OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH EGYPTIAN
 FORCES AS THE GDE/MDJ DESIRES.

(H) RDJTF UNIT EXERCISES: IN ADDITION TO OR IN LIEU OF
 MAU EXERCISES, A PRIORITY NEED EXISTS TO CONDUCT
 AS A TEST OF OUR DEPLOYMENT/STAGING CAPABILITIES AND TO
 VALIDATE OUR PLANNING FACTORS. CURRENT PLANNING EN-
 VISIONS THE DEPLOYMENT AND EXERCISE OF AN INFANTRY
 BATTALION (1200-1500 MEN INCLUDING COMMAND AND CONTROL
 ELEMENTS FROM TASK FORCE HQS.). THE EARLIEST TIMING WOULD
 BE IN LATE 1980 WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR ADDITIONAL EXER-
 CISES IN 1981. LOCATION OF SUCH EXERCISES WOULD ALSO BE
 FLEXIBLE--E. G., THEY MIGHT BE AT QENA, RAS BANAS OR
 OTHER REMOTE DESERT LOCATION. JOINT EXERCISES WITH
 EGYPTIAN FORCES WOULD BE WELCOMED. IT IS RECOGNIZED
 THAT THE VARIOUS DEPLOYMENT/EXERCISE PROPOSALS MUST BE
 CONSIDERED AS A PACKAGE AND THAT THE FREQUENCY OF ALL
 SUCH ACTIVITIES IS A SENSITIVE ISSUE. THE QUESTION

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THEREFORE IS WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE, AND HOW OTHER FACTORS--E. G., THE EGYPTIAN TRAINING ASPECT OF THE F-4 DEPLOYMENT, THE ANTICIPATED PUBLICITY OF SUCH EXERCISES--INFLUENCE THAT DECISION. (YOU WILL SHORTLY RECEIVE A MORE DETAILED INSTRUCTION ON THIS SUBJECT.)

(J) FRIS MONITORING OF LIBYAN/SUDANESE BROADCASTS: THE RESULTS OF THE FEASIBILITY SURVEY ON THIS PROJECT ARE NOT YET KNOWN. BUT IF THE ALEXANDRIA LOCATION IS SUITABLE--AND ASSUMING THE CYPRUS ALTERNATIVE REMAINS UNLIKELY--THIS PROJECT COULD TAKE ON ADDED STATURE. WHILE OF LOW VISIBILITY, IT IS LIKELY TO BE WEIGHED IN EGYPTIAN MINDS WITH OTHER BROADCAST ACTIVITIES CITED AS HIGH PRIORITIES ABOVE. AGAIN, THE LINE MAY HAVE TO BE DRAWN SOMEWHERE ON SUCH ACTIVITIES WHICH CAN BE VIEWED AS ANTI-ARAB/ANTI-MUSLIM--I. E., AS DISLOYAL TO THE "ARAB NATION".

(I) COMBINED NAVAL EXERCISES: THIS COMPARATIVELY LOWER PRIORITY POSSIBILITY IS LIKELY TO BE LIMITED INITIALLY TO THE PARAMETERS OF A "PASSEX" (I. E., A TOTAL OF SIX SHIPS AND 12 AIRCRAFT AMONG BOTH PARTICIPANTS). WE WOULD WISH TO AVOID ANY COINCIDENCE IN THE TIMING OF SUCH EXERCISES WITH ISRAEL, IN ORDER TO AVOID IMPLICATIONS OF TRI-LATERAL DEFENSE ACTIVITIES/PLANNING.

(K) TRAINING AND UNIT EXCHANGE PROGRAM: THE CONCEPT IS FOR TWO-WAY EXCHANGES--EGYPTIAN UNITS TO THE US, US UNITS TO EGYPT. THIS MIGHT START AS SMALL AS AT THE PLATOON LEVEL. LANGUAGE PROBLEMS ARE LIKELY TO BE AN INHIBITING FACTOR AS COULD WHATEVER WOULD BE EGYPT'S SHARE OF THE COST, E. G., TRANSPORTATION. BUT SUCH EXCHANGES WOULD FACILITATE OVERALL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COULD BE OF SIGNIFICANCE IF CONDITIONS DICTATE SHARED RESPONSE TO AREA DEVELOPMENTS AT A LATER DATE. TRAINING NATURE OF THIS ITEM WILL BE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES. IF THE FIRST EXCHANGE--PERHAPS AS EARLY AS OCTOBER--BROUGHT AN EGYPTIAN UNIT TO THE US, THAT WOULD BE A WELCOMED CONTRAST TO THE HEAVY LOAD BEING PLACED ON EGYPTIAN SOIL. WE WOULD GIVE YOU FURTHER DETAILS BEFORE MAKING AN ACTUAL PROPOSAL TO THE GOE.

8. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES BY US PERSONNEL IN EGYPT, THERE HAS BEEN A RELATED REQUIREMENT UNDER POTENTIAL CONSIDERATION WHICH WE WISH YOU TO BE AWARE OF--POSSIBLE USG REQUESTS TO EGYPT THAT IT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA. NO FINAL DECISIONS HAVE YET BEEN TAKEN ON THIS MATTER NOR HAVE WE BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY. UNTIL THAT HAPPENS, WE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT WANT TO RAISE THIS PROPOSAL WITH THE GOE FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. IN FACT, IT WOULD DEPEND HEAVILY ON A FACILITY ACCESS AGREEMENT BEING SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED FOR SOMALIA. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS POTENTIALLY ANOTHER ITEM ON THE PRIORITIES TABLE OF WHICH YOU SHOULD BE AWARE AS YOU CONSIDER THE TOTAL PICTURE.

9. IN ADDITION TO ALL OF THE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCEED WITH A VARIETY OF THE ABOVE PROGRAMS, THE CONSTRAINT OF LIMITED FINANCING IS A MAJOR ONE, THOUGH SOME NEW FUNDING MAY BE ON THE HORIZON. FOR SOME ITEMS, STRICTLY LIMITED FUNDING WILL INFLUENCE THE PACE OF ACTIVITY REGARDLESS OF OUR BASIC DECISIONS. IN SHORT, EVEN GIVEN FULL EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE, WE ARE UNLIKELY TO MOVE FORWARD ACROSS THE BOARD WITH ALL OF THESE PROJECTS. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE INTEREST OF LOOKING AT THE FULL RANGE OF REQUIREMENTS, WE BELIEVE EVEN THOSE PROJECTS WITHOUT FINANCING NEED OUR REVIEW--AND SUBSEQUENTLY GOE REVIEW--NOW.

10. IN TERMS OF ASSESSING TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT ON US PRESENCE IN EGYPT, AN ILLUSTRATIVE, GRAPHIC PORTRAYAL OF ONGOING, AND PROPOSED USG-GOE MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATED ACTIVITIES WAS HAND CARRIED THE WEEK OF JULY 7 TO OMC BY COL. E. C. REDICAN. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ELEMENT OF THE PORTRAYAL IS INCOMPLETE. MUSKIE

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